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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
____________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
PAUL DILLON, #07-B-1374,
Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RJI #16-1-2014-0111.23
INDEX # 2014-216
ORI #NY016015J

-against-

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF
PAROLE,
Respondent.
____________________________________________X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Paul Dillon, verified on March 5, 2014 and filed in the
Franklin County Clerk’s office on March 21, 2014. Petitioner, who is an inmate at the Bare
Hill Correctional Facility, is challenging the June 2013 determination denying him parole
and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months. The Court issued an Order to
Show Cause on April 3, 2014 and has received and reviewed respondent’s Answer and
Return, including in camera materials, verified on May 21, 2014 and supported by the
May 21, 2014 Letter Memorandum of Hilary D. Rogers, Esq., Assistant Attorney General,
as well as by the Affirmation of William B. Gannon, Esq., Assistant Counsel to the New
York State Board of Parole, dated April 16, 2014. The Court has also received and
reviewed petitioner’s Reply thereto (denominated Answer and Return), sworn to on
May 28, 2014 and filed in the Franklin County Clerk’s office on June 4, 2014.
On January 17, 2007 petitioner was sentenced in Onondaga County Court, as a
second felony offender, to three indeterminate sentences of 3½ to 7 years each upon his
convictions of the three counts of the crime of Burglary 3°. The sentencing court directed
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that two of the indeterminate sentences run concurrently with respect to each other but
that the third runs consecutively with respect to the two concurrent sentences.
Petitioner made his initial appearance before a Parole Board on June 4, 2013.
Following that appearance a decision was rendered denying him discretionary release and
directing that he be held for an additional 24 months. The parole denial determination
reads as follows:
“DESPITE YOUR HAVING RECEIVED AN EARNED ELIGIBILITY
CERTIFICATE, PAROLE WAS DENIED.
AFTER A PERSONAL
INTERVIEW, A CAREFUL REVIEW OF YOUR RECORD, INCLUDING
THE RISK YOU POSE TO THE COMMUNITY, THE REHABILITATIVE
EFFORTS YOU HAVE UNDERTAKEN, EDUCATIONAL
ACCOMPLISHMENTS, AS WELL AS YOUR LIKELIHOOD OF
RECIDIVISM AND AFTER DUE DELIBERATION, IT IS THE
DETERMINATION OF THIS PANEL THAT IF YOU WERE RELEASED AT
THIS TIME, THERE IS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT YOU
WOULD NOT LIVE AT LIBERTY WITHOUT VIOLATING THE LAW, AND
THAT YOUR RELEASE AT THIS TIME WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE
WITH THE WELFARE AND SAFETY OF THE COMMUNITY.
YOU APPEARED BEFORE THIS BOARD WITH AN INSTANT OFFENSE
OF BURGLARY 3RD (THREE COUNTS) WHEREIN YOU COMMITTED
MULTIPLE BURGLARIES AT SEPARATE ESTABLISHMENTS AND
STOLE PROPERTY THEREFROM.
THIS INSTANT OFFENSE
REPRESENTS A CONTINUATION OF A LIFELONG PATTERN OF
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR BEGINNING IN 1979. YOU HAVE HAD
MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS AND INCARCERATIONS. YOU HAVE A
WELL ESTABLISHED PATTERN OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR THAT HAS
BEEN UNDETERRED BY PRIOR COURT IMPOSED SENTENCES, AND
LENIENCY SHOWN YOU BY THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, ALL
LEADING THIS PANEL TO DENY YOUR DISCRETIONARY RELEASE AT
THIS TIME.”
The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal from the June 2013 parole
denial determination was received by the DOCCS Parole Appeals Unit on August 7, 2013.
The Appeals Unit, however, failed to issue its findings and recommendation within the
four month time frame set forth in 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c). This proceeding ensued.
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Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C , subpart A,
§§38-f and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not
so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the
law. In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted
pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this
article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional
record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy
and interactions with staff and inmates . . . (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate . . . (vii) the seriousness of the offense with
due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney
for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as consideration of
any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior
to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and
pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement . . .”
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259i(5) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268,
Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908 and Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d 614. Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements. See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
One portion of the petition is focused on the assertion that the parole denial
determination was improperly based solely on the nature of the crimes underlying
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petitioner’s incarceration, as well as his prior criminal record, without adequate
consideration of other relevant statutory factors. A Parole Board, however, need not
assign equal weight to each statutory factor it is required to consider in connection with
a discretionary parole determination, nor is it required to expressly discuss each of those
factors in its written decision. See Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197, lv granted 23 NY3d
903, Valentino v. Evans, 92 AD3d 1054 and Martin v. New York State Division of Parole,
47 AD3d 1152. As noted by the Appellate Division, Third Department, the role of a court
reviewing a parole denial determination “. . . is not to assess whether the Board gave the
proper weight to the relevant factors, but only whether the Board followed the statutory
guidelines and rendered a determination that is supported, and not contradicted, by the
facts in the record. Nor could we effectively review the Board’s weighing process, given
that it is not required to state each factor that it considers, weigh each factor equally or
grant parole as a reward for exemplary institutional behavior.” Comfort v. New York State
Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295, 1296 (citations omitted).
In the case at bar, reviews of the DOCCS Parole Board Report and transcript of
petitioner’s June 4, 2013 Parole Board appearance reveal that the Board had before it
information with respect to the appropriate statutory factors, including petitioner’s receipt
of an Earned Eligibility Certificate, his therapeutic/vocational programing records,
COMPAS ReEntry Risk Assessment Instrument, sentencing minutes, disciplinary record
and release plans/community support in addition to the circumstances of the crimes
underlying petitioner’s incarceration and his prior criminal record. The Court, moreover,
finds nothing in the hearing transcript to suggest that the Parole Board cut short
petitioner’s discussion of any relevant factor or otherwise prevented him from expressing
clear and complete responses to its inquiries. Indeed, before the June 4, 2013 Parole
Board appearance was concluded one of the
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petitioner as follows: “Is there anything you would like to say at this point you think we
may not have already covered in the interview?” Petitioner responded as follows: “I have
done a lot of soul searching and introspection and I asked myself if I was asked why should
I be released today, what would I say? The things that really drive me is that I haven’t
really given up on myself. Sometimes being in these places, being older, many people
believe they can’t make the transition into mainstream society; I believe I can do that. I
still have childhood ambitions and I believe I can make it.”
In view of the above, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the Parole Board
failed to consider relevant statutory factors. See Pearl v. New York State Division of
Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 and Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828. Since the requisite statutory
factors were considered, and given the narrow scope of judicial review of discretionary
parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the denial
determination in this case was affected by irrationality boarding on impropriety as a result
of the emphasis placed by the Board on the nature of the crimes underlying petitioner’s
incarceration as well as his prior criminal record dating back almost 35 years. See
Sutherland v. Evans, 82 AD3d 1428, White v. Dennision, 29 AD3d 1144 and Pearl v. New
York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1058.
Citing King v. New York State Division of Parole, 190 AD2d 423, aff’d 83 NY2d
788, petitioner specifically argues that the seriousness of the crimes underlying an
inmate’s incarceration “ . . . is not to be the determining factor in considering . . . [such]
inmate[’]s parole.” In King the Appellate Division, First Department, not only determined
that the Parole Board improperly considered matters not within its purview (penal policy
with respect to convicted murders) but also that the Parole Board failed “ . . . to consider
and fairly weigh all of the information available to them concerning petitioner that was
relevant under the statute, which clearly demonstrates his extraordinary rehabilitative
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achievements and would appear to strongly militate in favor of granting parole.” Id at 433.
The appellate-level court in King went on to note that the only statutory criterion
referenced by the Board in the parole denial determination was the seriousness of the
crime underlying Mr. King’s incarceration (felony murder of an off-duty police officer
during the robbery of a fast food restaurant). According to the Appellate Division, First
Department, “[s]ince . . . the Legislature has determined that a murder conviction per se
should not preclude parole, there must be a showing of some aggravating circumstances
beyond the inherent seriousness of the crime itself.” Id at 433.
This Court (Supreme Court, Franklin County) first notes that although the criminal
offense underlying Mr. King’s incarceration was far more serious than the crimes
underlying petitioner’s incarceration, Mr. King had no prior contacts with the law (id at
426) while the petitioner in the case at bar has a criminal record dating back almost 35
years, thus prompting the Parole Board to underscore his “ESTABLISHED PATTERN OF
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR . . .” This distinguishing factor might, in and of itself, meet the
First Department’s requirement that a parole denial determination be supported by
aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the underlying crime. It is
also noted, however, that in July of 2014 the Appellate Division, Third Department - whose
precedent is binding on this Court - effectively determined that the above-referenced
“aggravating circumstances” requirement enunciated by the First Department in King does
not represent the state of the law in the Third Department. See Hamilton v. New York
State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268. In Hamilton it was noted that the Third
Department “ . . . has repeatedly held - both recently and historically - that, so long as the
[Parole] Board considers the factors enumerated in the statute [Executive Law §259i(2)(c)(A)] it is ‘entitled . . . to place a greater emphasis on the gravity of [the] crime’
(Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197, 203 (2014), lv granted 23 NY3d 903 (2014)
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(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)’ . . .” Id at 1271 (citations omitted). After
favorably citing nine cases decided by it between 1977 and 2014, the Appellate Division,
Third Department, in Hamilton ended that string of cites as follows: “ . . . but see Matter
of King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 AD2d 423, 434 (1993), aff’d on other
grounds 83 NY2d 788[1] (1994) (a First Department case holding, in conflict with our
precedent, that the Board [of Parole] may not deny discretionary release based solely on
the nature of the crime when the remaining statutory factors are considered only to be
dismissed as not outweighing the seriousness of the crime).” 119 AD3d 1268, 1272. The
Hamilton court continued as follows:
“Particularly relevant here, we have held that, even when a petitioner’s
institutional behavior and accomplishments are ‘exemplary,’ the Board may
place ‘particular emphasis’ on the violent nature or gravity of the crime in
denying parole, as long as the relevant statutory factors are considered
(Matter of Valderrama v. Travis, 19 AD3d at 905). In so holding we
explained that, despite [the Valderrama] petitioner’s admirable educational
and vocational accomplishments and positive prison disciplinary history,
‘[o]ur settled jurisprudence is that a parole determination made in
accordance with the requirements of the statutory guidelines is not subject
to further judicial review unless it is affected by irrationality bordering on
impropriety’ (id. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). We
emphasize that this Court [Appellate Division, Third Department] has
repeatedly reached the same result, on the same basis, when reviewing
denials of parole to petitioners whom we recognized as having exemplary
records and as being compelling candidates for release . . .” 119 AD3d 1268,
1272 (additional citations omitted).
This Court therefore finds petitioner’s reliance on the decision of the Appellate Division,
First Department, in King to be misplaced.
1

The decision of the Court of Appeals in King only referenced the fact that “ . . . one of the [Parole]
Commissioners considered factors outside the scope of the applicable statute, including penal philosophy,
the historical treatment of individuals convicted of murder, the death penalty, life imprisonment without
parole, and the consequences to society if those sentences are not in place. Consideration of such factors
is not authorized by Executive Law §259-i.” 83 NY2d 788, 791. The Court of Appeals, however, did not
address that aspect of the Appellate Division, First Department, decision in King holding that a parole denial
determination must be based upon a showing of some aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent
seriousness of the underlying crime.
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Petitioner also argues that the Parole Board improperly evaluated his risk
assessment in that he was scored as a low risk for committing a new violent felony offense,
for rearrest and/or for absconding.

This Court notes, however, that

although the

Appellate Division, Third Department, has determined that a risk and needs assessment
instrument (such as COMPAS) must be utilized in connection with post-September 30,
2011 parole release determinations (see Linares v. Evans, 112 AD3d 1056, Malerba v.
Evans, 109 AD3d 1067, lv denied 22 NY3d 858 and Garfield v. Evans, 108 AD3d 830),
there is nothing in such cases, or the amended version of Executive Law §259-c(4), to
suggest that the quantified risk assessment determined through utilization of the risk and
needs assessment instrument supercedes the independent discretionary authority of the
Parole Board to determine, based upon its consideration of the factors set forth in
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), whether or not an inmate should be released to parole
supervision. The “risk and need principles” that must be incorporated pursuant to the
amended version of Executive Law §259-c(4), while intended to measure the rehabilitation
of a prospective parolee as well as the likelihood that he/she would succeed under
community-based parole supervision, serve only to “ . . . assist members of the state board
of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”
Executive Law §259-c(4)(emphasis added). Thus, while the Parole Board was required to
consider the COMPAS instrument when exercising its discretionary authority to determine
whether or not petitioner should be released from DOCCS custody to community-based
parole supervision, it was not bound by the quantified results of the COMPAS assessment
and was free to grant or deny parole based upon its independent assessment of the factors
set forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A). See Rivera v. New York State Division of
Parole, 119 AD3d 1107 and Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc 3d 896, aff’d 117 AD3d 1258, lv
denied 24 NY3d 901.
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A Parole Board considering a DOCCS inmate for discretionary release is required
to take into account any parole recommendation of the sentencing judge and is therefore
ordinarily required to have a copy of the relevant sentencing minutes. See Standley v.
New York State Division of Parole, 34 AD3d 1169 and McLaurin v. New York State Board
of Parole, 27 AD3d 565. In the case at bar the Board’s receipt of the April 17, 2007
sentencing minutes was noted in the Parole Board Report (Exhibit C annexed to
respondent’s Answer and Return) and on page two of the transcript of the June 4, 2013
parole interview (Exhibit F annexed to respondent’s Answer and Return). In any event,
this Court has reviewed the sentencing minutes (Exhibit A annexed to respondent’s
Answer and Return) and finds nothing therein that would constitute a favorable parole
recommendation of the sentencing judge. See Duffy v. New York State Division of Parole,
74 AD3d 965 (imposition of less than maximum sentence did not constitute an indication
that the sentencing court made a favorable parole recommendation).
Finally, this Court finds no basis to conclude that the Parole Board, by its denial
determination, usurped the authority of the judiciary by effectively resentencing petitioner
for his crimes. See Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295, Smith
v. New York State Division of Parole, 64 AD3d 1030 and Marsh v. New York State
Division of Parole, 31 AD3d 898.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.

Dated:

December 19, 2014 at
Indian Lake, New York.

__________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Supreme Court Justice
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